I analyze the sensitivity of a ¢rm's investment to its own cash £ow in the benchmark case where ¢nancing is frictionless. This sensitivity has been proposed as a measure of ¢nancing constraints in earlier studies. I ¢nd that the investment^cash £ow sensitivities that obtain in the frictionless benchmark are very similar, both in magnitude and in patterns they exhibit, to those observed in the data. In particular, the sensitivity is higher for ¢rms with high growth rates and low dividend payout ratios. Tobin's q is shown to be a more noisy measure of near-term investment plans for these ¢rms.
This paper attempts to answer the above questions by analyzing the investment^cash £ow sensitivities that obtain in the benchmark case with no ¢nancing constraints. I develop a model of ¢rm growth and investment based on the standard neoclassical models of Lucas (1967) , Treadway (1969) , and Hayashi (1982) . The new feature of the model is that younger ¢rms face uncertainty about their growth prospects, and this uncertainty is resolved through time as cash £ow realizations provide new information. The main results of the paper are as follows. First, investment is sensitive to cash £ow for all ¢rms, even after conditioning on Tobin's q. Second, and more importantly, the sensitivity is higher for young, small ¢rms with high growth rates and low dividend payout ratios. In fact, the model successfully matches the sensitivities reported for these ¢rms in empirical studies.Third,Tobin's q is shown to be a more noisy measure of the investment opportunity set for young ¢rms with high growth rates. A substantial part of q for these ¢rms represents the option value of long-term growth potential. Since this option value is not very informative about near-term investment plans, q performs poorly in controlling for current investment.
The model setup is the frictionless, neoclassical environment. Each ¢rm is characterized by a production technology, where the pro¢t rate is a function of the capital stock and current productivity. Productivity is composed of a permanent component (the project quality, dictating the long-run average ¢rm size), and a mean-reverting transitory shock, but these two components are not separately observable. Each ¢rm starts its life facing uncertainty about its project quality. The uncertainty is resolved in time as cash £ow observations provide new information, as in Jovanovic (1982) .Young ¢rms are small, and they reach their steadystate average sizes after an extended growth period. Since ¢rms are uncertain about their project qualities, cash £ow shocks during this growth period are highly informative about long-run pro¢tability. Hence, young ¢rms revise their growth plans aggressively in response to cash £ow shocks.This ampli¢es the link between cash £ow and investment.
Given this theoretical setup, I calibrate the model parameters and simulate data to generate a panel of ¢rms. FHP and subsequent studies assign ¢rms into groups based on a priori likelihood of being ¢nancially constrained, and then analyze the investment^cash £ow sensitivity for each group. Following FHP, I sort the model ¢rms based on their dividend payout ratios.
1 For all dividend payout classes, investment is sensitive to cash £ow, even though Tobin's q is included as a control variable in investment regressions. More importantly, the sensitivity is much higher for the low payout classes. These sensitivities are very close in magnitude to their counterparts reported in FHP. In the model, ¢rms with high growth rates use their cash £ow primarily for funding investment, and, hence, pay little or no dividends. High sensitivity of investment to cash £ow is, in fact, a characteristic of such ¢rms that possess signi¢cant growth opportunities. Low dividend payout proxies for growth; therefore, splits based on dividend payout result in di¡erential investment^cash £ow sensitivities across classes of ¢rms.
Why is investment highly sensitive to cash £ow for growth ¢rms? One reason is that cash £ow shocks within a year provide new information about project quality and trigger signi¢cant adjustments in investment, but beginning-of-the-year Tobin's q value, the control variable in investment regressions, fails to capture such new information. Interestingly, the sensitivity results survive even after this econometric issue is addressed by removing the surprise component of cash £ow. Investment is sensitive to cash £ow expectations at the beginning of the year, too, and even this sensitivity is substantially higher for growth ¢rms. In other words, q is a more noisy measure of investment for these ¢rms. Further analysis shows that the source of the noise in q is the value of long-term growth options introduced by project quality uncertainty. Part of q represents the option value of long-term growth potential, but this part is not very informative about near-term investment expectations. In e¡ect, the option value adds noise to the part of q that re£ects near-term investment plans. Cash £ow is closely linked to current productivity, but not to the value of long-term growth options.Therefore, it serves as a useful instrument with respect to the noise in q.
Similar to this paper, Erickson and Whited (2000) argue that the neoclassical framework can account for the empirical cash £ow sensitivity ¢ndings once Tobin's q is treated as a noisy proxy for marginal q. In their setup, the noise in Tobin's q is generic, whereas in this paper, the sources of such noise and their relative contributions to the investment^cash £ow sensitivity are analyzed. In another related study, Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) construct estimates of marginal q using information in cash £ow, and show that the constructed marginal q performs better than Tobin's q in explaining investment. Their result is in line with the ¢nding in this paper that cash £ow is informative about investment and is weakly related to the noise in q. Zingales (1997, 2000) question the validity of the investment^cash £ow sensitivity as a measure of ¢nancing constraints, though their line of argument is di¡erent.They show that the sensitivity is not necessarily higher for ¢rms that are more constrained. However, unconstrained ¢rms always exhibit zero sensitivity of investment to cash £ow in their two-period setup. In contrast, the sensitivity is positive in the frictionless model of this paper, illustrating the alternative factors that may explain the empirical ¢ndings.
Concerned about a possible systematic relationship between ¢rm sorting criteria (dividend payout, age, size, etc.) and the investment opportunity set, several studies have considered experiments that are more likely to isolate the ¢nancing role of cash £ow. In Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) , the sorting criterion is membership in a bank-centered industrial group, which is unlikely to be correlated with growth potential. Their result is that the investment^cash £ow sensitivity is lower for member ¢rms, which have easier access to ¢nancing due to their close ties to a major bank.
2 Lamont (1997) examines the response of invest-ment by non-oil subsidiaries of oil companies to the 1986 oil shock and ¢nds that these ¢rms signi¢cantly decreased their investment. Finally, Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) directly test the Euler equation of the dynamic optimization problem of the ¢rm, and show that the Euler equation does not hold for highly levered ¢rms, ¢rms with no bond ratings (Whited) , and ¢rms with low dividend payout (Bond and Meghir) . The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model and provides the characterization of the optimal investment rule. Section II discusses the calibration and the simulation methodology. Section III presents the results. Section IVconcludes.
I. The Model
The analysis is of partial equilibrium type, in that it focuses on a single ¢rm operating in a risk-neutral economy with a constant discount rate. In Section III, where simulation evidence is presented, a large number of such ¢rms are considered.
A. The Firm
The ¢rm's operating cash £ow is generated by a Cobb^Douglas pro¢t function given by
Here, F(K t , y, z t ) is the cash £ow rate at time t, K t is the capital stock, ao1 is the returns to scale parameter, y is the project quality, and z t is the transitory shock. The project quality y is constant through time, and is drawn at t 5 0 from a normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation s y . The transitory shock z t follows a mean reverting process given by
where r40 is the mean reversion coe⁄cient, s z is the instantaneous standard deviation of z, and w is a standard Brownian motion.The initial value of the transitory shock z 0 is drawn from the invariant distribution of z, which is normal with mean 0 and standard deviation s z = ffiffiffiffiffi ffi 2r p : The values of y and z t are not separately observable to the ¢rm. The ¢rm can only observe the cash £ow rate F(K t , y, z t ). Inverting (1), the ¢rm therefore observes c t y1z t at time t.
The capital adjustment cost rate is
ability of a bank to restructure debt more easily will attract those ¢rms that are likely to default at a time when they have pro¢table investment opportunities, that is, ¢rms with low sensitivities of investment to cash £ow from existing operations. The resulting self-selection is another example of how the sorting criterion may be correlated with the characteristics of investment opportunities.
where f is the cost parameter, d is the depreciation rate of capital, and I t is the investment rate at time t.
B. The Firm's Problem
The ¢rm's objective is to maximize the expected discounted sum of future net cash £ow. At time t, the ¢rm has capital stock K t , and has observed the cash £ow history from time 0 to t. Since both y and z t are Gaussian, the information set of the ¢rm at time t is summarized by three variables: (1) the conditional expectation of the project quality m t y , (2) the conditional expectation of the transitory shock m t z , and (3) the common variance of the estimation error of these variables g t . The ¢rm solves the following optimal control problem:
where
The net cash £ow of the ¢rm at time s is the cash £ow from operations F(K s , y, z s ), minus investment I s , minus the capital adjustment cost C (I s , K s ). In (4), the ¢rm value V at time t is given by the time-t expected value of discounted future net cash £ow generated by the optimal investment policy I.The discount rate is r. The optimization problem is subject to the law of motion of the capital stock, (5). Equations (6) to (8) describe the evolution of the information set of the ¢rm. 4 Recall that the ¢rm observes the cash £ow rate, or equivalently c s 5 y1z s , at time s.
The unexpected component of the change in c s , given by (9), provides new information to the ¢rm. It is this new information content of cash £ow that leads to revisions in the conditional expectations y and z, hence, the laws of motion (6) and (7). Notice, from (8), that g t is decreasing in t. In words, the project quality estimate becomes more precise as the ¢rm gets older.
The system (4) to (8) is a standard optimal control problem. The derivation of the Hamilton^Jacobi^Bellman (HJB) equation characterizing the optimal ¢rm value is straightforward, and hence is omitted. The optimal investment rule is given by
Here,V K , the partial derivative of V with respect to K, is the ''marginal q''of the ¢rm. As shown by Abel and Eberly (1994) , marginal q is the present value of the stream of expected pro¢t of an incremental unit of capital. The above equation indicates that the investment to capital ratio is a linear function of marginal q at all times. Intuitively, when marginal q exceeds one, investment is pro¢table; consequently the ¢rm expands its capital stock by investing in excess of the depreciation rate. The opposite result holds when q is less than one. Higher values of the cost parameter f dampen this adjustment process. An analytical solution toV is di⁄cult to obtain, because of the nonlinearities induced by the diminishing marginal product of capital and the mean reverting state m z . Eberly (1996, 1997) are able to ¢nd closed form solutions, but only for cases where there is no mean-reverting technology shock and the production function is of constant returns to scale type. Given the di⁄culty with obtaining an analytical solution, I solve the problem (4) to (8) numerically.
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C. The Choice of Initial Capital Stock I specify a simple technology to endow the ¢rm with its initial capital stock. I assume that the ¢rm solves the following problem when choosing the initial capital stock:
where C 0 is the per unit cost of initial investment in capital goods. I assume that C 0 41, so that the initial investment is costly. In this case, the ¢rm will start with a smaller capital stock (relative to the long-run average), so young ¢rms will be smaller on average compared to mature ¢rms. 5 The numerical technique I use is polynomial approximation, as described in Judd (1999). Brie£y, it involves writing V as a polynomial of its arguments in the HJB equation, and then solving for the polynomial coe⁄cients that minimize an error criterion on a grid of points. The details of the numerical solution technique, as well as the derivation of the HJB equation, are available from the author upon request.
D. The Capital Structure of the Firm
Shareholders of the ¢rm invest the necessary amount to purchase the initial capital stock. Therefore the capital structure is all-equity at time zero. Thereafter, the ¢rm has access to a frictionless credit market, where it can borrow at the continuously compounded rate r if cash £ow is not su⁄cient to ¢nance new investment. Cash £ow is primarily used for investment and paying back the creditors. The remaining amount, if any, is paid to shareholders as dividends.
II. Calibration and Simulation

A. Calibration
I set the discount rate r 5 0.05, and the depreciation rate d 5 0.1. Using COM-PUSTAT data, Moyen (1999) estimates a value of 0.5866 for the persistence parameter of shocks to a Cobb^Douglas production function in a discrete-time setting. In the continuous-time setting here, her estimate approximately corresponds to r 5 0.5, so I assume this value for r. I choose the remaining technology parameters so that the key characteristics of the model-generated mature ¢rms match their counterparts in actual data. Mature ¢rms in actual data have very high dividend payout ratios; therefore, they are unlikely to be ¢nancially constrained. Hence, the environment these ¢rms operate in is closest to the frictionless setup of this paper. I set the returns to scale parameter a 5 0.7 to match the average cash £ow^capital ratio of mature ¢rms, which is 0.21 in FHP.
To calibrate s z , I use the time-series variation in CF/K. However, there is a continuum of {s z , f} pairs that deliver a given level of variability in CF/K. Intuitively, an increase in s z makes cash £ow more variable, but a smaller f allows for faster capital adjustment and leads to smaller variability in CF/K. In choosing the {s z , f} pair within this continuum, I match the investment^cash £ow sensitivity of Class 3 ¢rms of FHP, which is 0.23. The parameters that deliver this value (along with std(CF/K) 5 0.06 from FHP) for the model-generated mature ¢rms are f 5 4 and s z 5 0.32. The fact that these parameters are chosen to match an investment^cash £ow sensitivity may raise concerns about over¢tting. Notice, however, that only information about Class 3 ¢rms of FHP is used in this parameterization. As mentioned above, these ¢rms constitute a natural control group for this study. The main focus of the paper is on young, growing ¢rms, and the current parameterization does not make use of any information on such ¢rms.
I set C 0 5 3.9 based on a comparison of mean and median q values of mature and young ¢rms.
6 Given these parameter values, there is a one-to-one correspondence between s y and the variance of the initial quality estimate g 0 . As s y -N, g 0 converges to a positive constant equal to s z here, this bound is 0.1024. I choose a value of g 0 5 0.1, implying a high degree of initial uncertainty. The corresponding value for s y is 2.0656. 7 Table I summarizes the choice of parameter values.
B. Simulation Procedure
The simulations are carried out to generate a data set similar to that of FHP. FHP use the annual Value Line database, using observations on manufacturing ¢rms from 1969 to 1984.They form three classes of ¢rms based on dividend payout. Class 1 ¢rms have a ratio of dividends to income less than 0.1 for at least 10 of the 15 years in the data. For Class 2 ¢rms, the ratio is less than 0.2 but more than 0.1 for at least 10 years. Class 3 includes all other ¢rms.
I specify a slightly di¡erent sorting criterion than the one in FHP, since model ¢rms initiate dividends at a rather high rate. I assign ¢rms that pay no dividends for at least 10 out of 15 years to Class 1. Firms that pay no dividends for at least 5 but at most 9 years are assigned to Class 2. All other ¢rms are assigned to Class 3.
The arti¢cial data set is constructed as follows. For each ¢rm, I simulate data for 100 years.
8 Then I choose a random year j between 1 and 86, inclusive.The data of the ¢rm between years j and j114 are extracted, and the ¢rm is assigned to one of the three classes described above based on its dividend payout in these 15 years. I continue this procedure until each class has 3,000 ¢rms. 
III. Results
A. Summary Statistics
The results are not very sensitive to the speci¢c value of s y 5 2.0656 that characterizes the initial uncertainty. For example, s y 5 1 leads to results that are very similar to those that obtain with s y 5 2.0656. 8 In generating data, I discretize time by dividing a year into 40 equal periods, so that Dt 5 0.025, and assume that the optimal policy at the beginning of a period is followed for Dt units of time.
that only information about FHP's Class 3 ¢rms was used in choosing the parameters of the model. Therefore, the match of the statistics for Classes 1 and 2 is an indicator of whether the model replicates the major aspects of ¢rm growth in actual data. Three important statistics in this regard are the average retention ratio, the average investment^capital ratio, and the average cash £ow^capital ratio.
9 Table II shows that these characteristics in the model-generated data are very similar to their counterparts in actual data.Therefore the model successfully captures the average patterns in growth dynamics of real-world ¢rms. On the other hand, the model falls short of generating the observed time-series variation in investment and cash £ow. Notice that the average ¢rm standard deviations of both investment and cash £ow in Class 1 are below those reported in FHP. In the rest of the analysis, cash £ow is de¢ned as income after interest expense.
B. Regression Results
In this section, I report the results of regressions of the form
Above, I i,t is the investment of ¢rm i in year t, CF i,t is the cash £ow in the same year, K i,t is the capital stock at the beginning year t, and q i,t is the beginning-ofthe-year Tobin's q, de¢ned as the total market value of the ¢rm normalized by K i,t . The ¢xed ¢rm e¡ect c i , the investment^cash £ow sensitivity c 1 , and the investment^q sensitivity c 2 are coe⁄cients to be estimated, and e i,t is the error term.
The right-hand-side panel in Table III replicates Table 4 of FHP, where they report their results for the above regression. Table 4 of FHP constitutes their main evidence of ¢nancing constraints. It shows that the investment^cash £ow sensitivity is positive for all ¢rm classes, and is a lot larger for Class 1. FHP also estimate the same regression for the earlier periods of the data, namely the ¢rst 6 and the ¢rst 10 years. The result is that the cash £ow sensitivity for Class 3 does not signi¢cantly change as one considers the earlier periods, but increases substantially for Class 1. FHP interpret these results as evidence of severe ¢nancing for each dividend payout class, and for di¡erent time intervals. The three classes of ¢rms are generated by the simulation procedure described in Section II.B, using the parameter values in Table I .The data cover 15 years for each ¢rm. The top panel reports the results of the regression using observations from years 1 to 6. The middle panel contains the results for years 1 to 10. The bottom panel reports the results for the full 15 -year sample. The right-hand-side panel replicates the corresponding results in FHP for comparison. Above, I i,t is the investment of ¢rm i in year t, CF i,t is the cash £ow in the same year, K i,t is the capital stock at the beginning of year t, and q i,t is the beginning-of-the-year ¢rm value divided by K i,t . The ¢xed ¢rm e¡ect c i , the investment^cash flow sensitivity c 1 , and the investment-q sensitivity c 2 are the coefficients to be estimated (only c 1 and c 2 are reported below), and e i,t is the error term. Also reported are the adjusted R 2 values. constraints. The reasoning is as follows. Tobin's q included in the regression accounts for the investment opportunity set of the ¢rm; therefore, a signi¢cant estimate of the cash £ow coe⁄cient must re£ect the e¡ect of ¢nancing frictions. Firms in Class 1, which are typically small and young, face more stringent constraints due to asymmetric information problems; hence, they exhibit high sensitivity of investment to cash £ow. FHP argue that the higher sensitivities that obtain for the earlier periods strengthen this view, since Class 1 ¢rms are younger and less recognized in the earlier part of the sample. The left-hand-side panel in Table III reporting the results for the model-generated data shows that the FHP story is not necessarily true.There are no ¢nancing constraints in the current model; ¢rms have access to a frictionless credit market.Yet the resulting cash £ow sensitivity patterns and magnitudes are quite similar to the ones in FHP. Investment is highly sensitive to cash £ow for all ¢rm classes and all periods. The full-sample sensitivities for classes 1 through 3 are 0.5109, 0.3082, and 0.2600, respectively. These are very similar to 0.461, 0.363, and 0.230 reported by FHP. Also, the sensitivity for Class 1 increases substantially as one considers the earlier periods. When the regressions are run for the ¢rst six years of the sample, the cash £ow sensitivity for Class 1 rises to 0.6587, whereas the same coe⁄cient for Class 3 is only 0.2860.
Overall, the results indicate that the observed investment^cash £ow sensitivities are not anomalies in a frictionless market. Investment is sensitive to cash £ow in the benchmark case without ¢nancing constraints, and the sensitivity is higher for low dividend payout, high-growth ¢rms. In fact, the model is able to match the observed magnitudes of the investment^cash £ow sensitivity for these ¢rms quite successfully.
Why do low dividend payout ¢rms have higher investment^cash £ow sensitivities? Dividend payout per se has no e¡ect on a ¢rm's investment decisions, since Miller^Modigliani perfect market conditions are satis¢ed in the model. It is rather the case that dividend payout is correlated with ¢rm age, and younger ¢rms exhibit higher investment^cash £ow sensitivities. Recall that in the model, growth in the early years is ¢nanced by issuing debt. Only after the debt is paid back does the ¢rm start paying dividends. Therefore, younger ¢rms tend to pay little or no dividends. Regression results based on an age sort (unreported) indicate that the investment^cash £ow sensitivity is monotonically declining in age. Hence, sorting ¢rms on the basis of dividend payout results in di¡erential investment^cash £ow sensitivities across ¢rm classes.
10
A remark about ¢rm age is in order. In the model, age coincides with the maturity of the only project of the ¢rm. Real world ¢rms invest in multiple projects that arrive sequentially in time. Hence, an old but small ¢rm may as well discover 10 It should be noted that the speci¢c capital structure policy model ¢rms follow is a conservative one in terms of generating the high investment^cash £ow sensitivity of low dividend payout ¢rms. If external ¢nancing needs were satis¢ed in part by issuing equity, or if the ¢rms had targeted a positive debt^equity ratio, ¢rms would have less debt to run down, and, hence, would start paying dividends earlier. In that case, the typical ¢rm in the low-payout class would be even younger, and the investment^cash £ow sensitivity of the low-payout class would be even higher. a pro¢table project and exhibit high growth. Clearly, a high investment^cash £ow sensitivity re£ects the fact that the growth project is the main source of cash £ow in the model; otherwise, ¢rm age is not the directly relevant factor.Therefore, the results should be interpreted within a more general context where young ¢rms are those that have recently discovered major growth opportunities relative to the size of their existing operations.
C. The Information Content of Cash Flow
The results of the previous subsection indicate that cash £ow is highly informative about investment opportunities for growth ¢rms. In this subsection, I examine the nature of the information re£ected by cash £ow. In (12), cash £ow and investment are aggregates of £ow variables that are realized within each year, whereas Tobin's q is measured at the beginning of the year.Therefore, investment may be sensitive to cash £ow both because cash £ow shocks within a year provide new information, and because cash £ow re£ects information that is already known at the beginning of the year but is not captured by Tobin's q. To evaluate these two possibilities, I decompose cash £ow into its expected and surprise components, and estimate the sensitivity of investment to each component separately.
11 Note that both q and the expected cash £ow are in the information set of the ¢rm at the beginning of each year, whereas the surprise component of cash £ow is realized within the year.
Panel A of Table IV reports the sensitivity of investment to cash £ow surprises. The sensitivity is positive for all three classes, and it is considerably higher for Class 1. These results are not surprising. Cash £ow shocks provide new information about investment opportunities, and ¢rms respond by adjusting their capital stocks within the year. The response is stronger for young ¢rms, as cash £ow shocks are informative not only about current productivity but also about longrun growth prospects for these ¢rms.
Panel B of Table IV shows the results of the regression where the independent variables are Tobin's q and the expected cash £ow. For all three ¢rm classes, investment is sensitive to cash £ow expectations, indicating that Tobin's q is a noisy measure of the investment opportunity set. More importantly, this sensitivity is a lot higher for Class 1. In fact, the di¡erence between the sensitivities of Class 1 and Class 3 remains as large as in Table III after the surprise component of cash  £ow is removed. 12 Hence, the high investment^cash £ow sensitivities of young ¢rms in part re£ect the poor proxy quality of Tobin's q.
11 Speci¢cally, I calculate the expected value of year-t cash £ow given the information set of the ¢rm at the beginning of year t. There is no closed form solution for this expectation, so I calculate it numerically through simulations.
12 FHP run a similar regression, where they instrument cash £ow with lagged variables. Unfortunately they do not report the results of that regression; they just mention that the resulting di¡erence between the investment^cash £ow sensitivities of Class 1 and Class 3 ¢rms is as large as the di¡erence that obtains in the original (uninstrumented) regression. Since the instrumental variables regression removes the new information content of cash £ow, FHP interpret their ¢nding as further evidence of ¢nancing constraints. Panel B of Table IV shows that the same result obtains in the frictionless benchmark.
Why is Tobin's q a more noisy measure of investment for young ¢rms? Recall that a young ¢rm faces project quality uncertainty. The fact that the uncertainty will be resolved over time creates implicit growth options.The option value stems from the upside growth potential that will be realized if the actual project quality turns out to be substantially higher than the current estimateFan event that is more likely if the current estimate is very imprecise. Notice that this option value is not very informative about near-term investment plans; rather, it relates to the resolution of uncertainty in the long-run, and, hence, re£ects long-term growth expectations. But being a part of total ¢rm value, the option value directly a¡ects q. In e¡ect, then, the value of long-term growth options adds noise to the part of q that measures near-term investment.
In the current continuous-time setup, it is di⁄cult to isolate the exact value of growth options, since these options are implicitly de¢ned. Nevertheless, one can derive an approximate value for these implicit options and analyze whether they are indeed responsible for the poor performance of q. Consider the ¢rm value at time t,V(K t , m t y , m t z , g t ).The uncertainty in growth prospects is captured by g t , the variance of the estimation error of project quality. Since it is this uncertainty that creates the implicit options, the part of ¢rm value that is due to g t , that is,
, 0), represents the option value of growth. The Table IV Information Content of Cash Flow
The table reports the coe⁄cients of the regression
for each dividend payout class. In Panel A, X i,t is the surprise component of cash £ow for ¢rm i in year t normalized by the beginning of the year capital stock, [CF i,t À ECF i,t ]/K i,t . In Panel B, X i,t is the expected component of cash £ow for year t at the beginning of the year normalized by capital stock, ECF i,t /K i,t . In both panels, q i,t is the beginning-of-the-year Tobin's q value. In Panel C, X i,t ECF i,t /K i,t , but q i,t is replaced by q i,t n , which is the q value of an otherwise identical ¢rm for which g t 5 0. 
be the corresponding ''noise-free'' component of q t . Panel C of Table IV presents the results of the investment regression where the independent variables are q n and the expected cash £ow. The results con¢rm the hypothesis that the source of the noise in q is the value of real options relating to long-term growth. For all ¢rm classes, the coe⁄cient of q n is higher than the coe⁄cient of q (from Panel B). Also, the sensitivity of investment to expected cash £ow declines once q is replaced by q n . Expected cash £ow is closely linked to current pro¢tability, but not to the value of long-term growth options. This weak relationship to the ''noise'' in q makes expected cash £ow a useful instrument in the investment regressions. Hence, investment is highly sensitive to expected cash £ow in regressions where q is the control variable.When q is replaced by the less noisy q n , the e¡ect of cash £ow diminishes. 13 Notice that the decline in the sensitivity to expected cash £ow from Panel B to Panel C is the largest for Class 1, and it is very small for Class 3. This makes sense, since the option value is substantial for young ¢rms (Class 1) but negligible for mature ones (Class 3).
14,15 Erickson and Whited (2000) show that positive investment^cash £ow sensitivities may obtain when Tobin's q is a noisy proxy for marginal q.The option value of long-term growth in the current discussion illustrates an important economic source for the noise in Tobin's q, which is modeled generically in Erickson and Whited. Unfortunately, the value of growth options is not observable in actual data, making an empirical evaluation of the idea di⁄cult. One indirect test may involve regressing the sum of next few years' investment, rather than only next year's, on q and expected cash £ow. If its failure is indeed related to the option value of long-term growth, then q should fare better once the investment ¢gure accounts for the optimal exercise of this option.
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13 The sensitivity to expected cash £ow is not completely eliminated when q n controls for investment. This is because the calculation of the option value is only approximate, and, hence, even q n contains noise (albeit less than q). 14 The option value, as a fraction of ¢rm value, is large and highly variable in Class 1 (mean 8 percent, standard deviation 5.5 percent), whereas it is small and does not vary as much in Class 3 (mean 1 percent, standard deviation 0.8 percent). For very young ¢rms, real options represent as high as 33 percent of ¢rm value. 15 It should be emphasized that q as a stand-alone variable is highly informative about investment opportunities of young ¢rms. In univariate regressions, investment-q sensitivity is the highest for Class 1 (results unreported). The poor proxy quality of q for these ¢rms becomes apparent only after cash £ow is included in the regressions. 16 The results of this experiment on model-generated data, which are not reported to save space, con¢rm the above intuition. When the dependent variable is the sum of the next four years' investment, the q sensitivity increases substantially relative to Panel B of Table IV, whereas the cash £ow sensitivity turns negative.
IV. Conclusion
This paper analyzes the sensitivity of investment to cash £ow in the benchmark case where ¢nancing is frictionless. Overall, the results indicate that the frictionless benchmark is able to account for the observed magnitudes of the investment^cash £ow sensitivity, and the patterns it exhibits. Investment is sensitive to cash £ow, even after controlling for its link to pro¢tability by conditioning on Tobin's q. Furthermore, the sensitivity is substantially higher for young, small ¢rms with high growth rates and low dividend payout ratios, as it is in the data. The uncertainty these ¢rms face about their growth prospects ampli¢es the investment^cash £ow sensitivity in two ways. First, the uncertainty is resolved in time as cash £ow realizations provide new information about investment opportunities. This makes investment highly sensitive to cash £ow surprises. Second, the uncertainty creates implicit growth options, whose values show up in q. Since these options relate to long-term growth potential but not to investment in the near-term, q performs as a noisy measure of short-term investment expectations. Having a weaker relationship with the value of long-term growth options, cash £ow acts as a useful instrument in investment regressions.
Both factors discussed above contribute to the failure of Tobin's q to control for the investment opportunity set, rendering the economic interpretation of empirical cash £ow sensitivity ¢ndings di⁄cult.The ¢rst issue, that is, the informativeness of cash £ow shocks, is an econometric one, and is relatively easy to handle; one can remove the e¡ects of the surprise component of cash £ow by using lagged instruments. The second problem is more fundamental; it illustrates the limitations of q as a composite measure of both short-and long-term investment expectations. Future work could address the issue of providing observable variables that account for di¡erent dimensions of growth separately, in e¡ect breaking down q into its components.
